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ABSTRACT 
The article is an analysis of the state of the nation and its public service in 
contemporary South Africa. It demonstrates that the Zuma administration 
is much more responsive to citizen and interest group interests than 
the Mbeki presidency was. This is not only reflected in the cabinet 
appointments, but also in the character of public policy, including 
economic policy. However, ideological divisions within the ruling 
party and a failure to contain elite and popular expectations have also 
accompanied this responsiveness. This, in turn, has hindered a social pact 
from developing between labour, business and the State. The article also 
demonstrates that state capacity has been compromised by a coupling of 
Affirmative Action with conservative macro-economics and an infusion 
of a corporate ethic into the public service. It concludes that this problem 
will only be addressed with a more nuanced Affirmative Action policy, 
a reconfiguration of the public mandate of the civil service, a more 
expansive fiscal agenda centered on the citizenry and firm proactive 
action taken against corruption. 
INTRODUCTION 
A relatively conservative political economy defined the South African transition 
in its first 15 years of democracy. This was of course always contested and 
reached its pinnacle in the political succession crisis that formally began in 
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2005. Now that this succession contest has been concluded, (Habib 2008 & 
Mangcu 2008) questions abound about the political economy that has been 
formed. What is the character of future economic policy likely to be? What 
is the current state of open political discourse - both in the ruling party and 
in the country as a whole? Has accountability to citizens been strengthened 
by developments of the last few years? And, what is the capacity of the post-
apartheid state? All of these questions speak to a more fundamental one: Can 
the post-apartheid state deliver on the fundamental aspirations of its citizenry? 
If this question is answered in the affirmative, then there is hope for the South 
African democracy. But if it is answered negatively, then the future should 
be anticipated with trepidation, as it is likely to be characterised by conflict, 
political turmoil and marginalisation, all of which are antithetical to the vision 
enshrined in the Freedom Charter. 
How do we go about developing an answer to this question? Most 
explanations about contemporary South African politics tend to adopt -
consciously or implicitly - an agential methodological approach that focuses on 
individuals and personalities. Two examples of this are Xolela Mangcu's (2008) 
recent book To the Brink and Mark Gevisser's (2007) biography on Thabo Mbeki, 
The Dream Deferred. For Gevisser, who provides the most sophisticated of these 
explanations, the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy and the 
imperial presidency under Mbeki was a product of his personality that emanated 
from his growing up in no-man's land - in between the rural and urban, 
modernism and traditionalism, father and comrade and the international and the 
national. This profoundly affected Mbeki. It generated the aloof personality that 
we have come to know, and defined both his technocratic orientation and the 
centralised management style of his presidency (Gevisser 2007). 
This explanation is not a comprehensive one. It does not recognise the 
issue of institutional constraints, and that individuals, however powerful their 
personalities, are constrained by the positions they occupy and the pressures they 
are subjected to. In the celebrated words of that much-maligned philosopher, 
Karl Marx, who writes in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: 
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx 
1972: 437). 
The methodological approach implicit in this maxim, in the words of Cardoso 
and Faletto (1979:x), "emphasizes (stet) not just the structural conditioning 
of social life, but also the historical transformation of structures by conflict, 
social movements and class struggles". Structures condition actors' behavior 
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and choices, but they can also be transformed under certain conditions. This 
is because structures generate contradictions and social tensions, which under 
certain historical circumstances establish a dynamic that enables individual and 
institutional actors to alter them. This, in turn, opens up new possibilities and 
limits to change. 
A more coherent explanation has to look at the systemic rationale for both 
macro-economic policy choices and the centralisation of power under Mbeki. 
When the ANC came into power in 1994, it confronted a number of pressures. 
Inheriting a nearly bankrupt state, it was confronted with an ambitious set of 
expectations from the previously disenfranchised, as well as an investment 
strike by the business community. To stimulate investment and growth, the ANC 
leadership felt that they had to make a series of economic concessions. Most of 
these concessions were captured in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
strategy (GEAR). Soon after they made this decision, they were confronted by 
another dilemma: how to get the programme approved. The leadership feared 
that its own comrades in the national legislature would defeat it. Subsequently, 
they bypassed the very structures of democracy that they had inaugurated, 
by endorsing GEAR in Cabinet and proceeding with its implementation. This 
established a centralising dynamic in the South African political system. From 
thereon it was a short step to appointing premiers and mayors and marginalising 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the South African 
Communist Union (SACP) and others who disagreed with Mbeki. Mbeki's 
economic policy and managerial style was a product of choices instilled upon 
him and his administration by the political and economic exigencies of South 
Africa in the mid-1990s (Habib and Padayachee 2000). 
Understanding political and economic life under Zuma requires a similar 
systemic methodological approach. It requires a focus on the structures of power 
that prevail in contemporary South African society and how these constrain 
and condition the policy choices and behaviour of political leaders and state 
officials. The defining event informing the contemporary balance of power 
in South Africa was the Polokwane conference in late 2007. This conference 
registered the Mbeki camp's defeat and brought to the fore the alliance of 
social forces that brought Jacob Zuma to the helm.3 Support for the Mbeki 
administration had unraveled as a result of both his personal behaviour and 
the fact that his policies failed to generate an inclusive development. As Mark 
Gevisser (2007) convincingly demonstrates, Mbeki's support had always been 
the intelligentsia, as well as the urban middle and upper middle classes. They 
supported Mbeki because they saw him as representing their vision of a caring, 
non-racial, modern, cosmopolitan social democracy. But his behaviour in the 
last years of his administration, betrayed their hopes. Mbeki's lack of empathy 
for citizens - especially on HIV/Aids and crime - and a popular perception that 
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he manipulated state institutions to settle political scores, punctured their hopes 
and aspirations. This led them to abandon him resulting in a downward spiral in 
his popular support (Gumede 2008). 
Ultimately, however, Mbeki's loss resulted from the rebellion that occurred 
within the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance against the character of the transition. 
As has been noted so often, Zuma's candidature was cemented not only by his 
own popularity, but also by the popular revulsion for the Mbeki administration. 
This revulsion was in large measure propelled by the fact that important quarters 
of the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance believed that Big Business and a narrow 
band of politically connected black entrepreneurs were the primary beneficiary 
of the transition. This prompted a diverse alliance of internal organisational 
stakeholders to throw in their lot with Zuma. This alliance comprised a mix of 
nationalist and socialists, black economic empowerment (BEE) entrepreneurs, 
the ANC Youth League, Cosatu and the SACP. The latter two organisations had 
hitherto been marginalised from the ruling party's leadership structures. Having 
played a central role in bringing Zuma to power, their voice was significantly 
strengthened. This is not to imply that Cosatu and the SACP rule the roost in the 
ANC, as some corporate leaders have come to fear (Bell 2009). This is far from 
the truth. Indeed, business still has significant power and leverage. In effect, all 
that exists now is a more equitable balance of power - both within the ruling 
party and in the country as a whole. This, in turn, constrains the behaviour and 
choices of the political elite and will condition the evolution of political and 
economic life in South Africa in the coming years. 
This article details this conditioning of political and economic life. It begins 
with an analysis of the Zuma administration's responsiveness to citizens and 
interest group stakeholders, both in the nature of its political appointments and in 
the character of public policy. Thereafter, the article reflects on the tensions and 
contestations spawned in the ruling party by the appeal to multiple stakeholders. 
This is followed by an analysis of the failure to realise a social pact as a means 
to address the service delivery protests. Hereafter the analytical focus shifts to 
the state of the public service and the reasons for the deficits in the delivery of 
its public mandate. The article concludes by drawing the argumentative strands 
together on the state of the nation and its public service. 
STATE RESPONSIVENESS AND ECONOMIC POLICY 
How has Jacob Zuma performed in office as we approach his first anniversary? 
Is his administration any different from its predecessor's? Any assessment must of 
course be mindful of his time in office. After all, a year is not a very long time. 
We cannot expect him to have delivered or even having started to deliver. But 
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we can start judging on whether he is on the right track. There are some criteria 
by which we can begin to assess him - the first and most apparent one would be 
through his Cabinet and other appointments. We can also judge him on how he 
has handled the various challenges that have emerged in his short time in office. 
Perhaps the best place to start any provisional assessment is by comparing 
Zuma's administration to its predecessor's. The most obvious contrast is its 
responsiveness to public opinion. Unlike Mbeki's administration,4 Zuma's 
one pays attention to citizens and stakeholders' concerns. This is reflected in 
numerous ways. It is most apparent in his appointments to Cabinet. With regard 
to the economic portfolio, business was concerned that Trevor Manuel would 
be left out and that there would be too fundamental a change in economic 
policy. The left, mainly represented by Cosatu and the SACP, were concerned 
that too little change would take place. They were worried that Manuel and 
company would maintain control of economic policy and alternative voices 
would not be heard. 
However, Zuma's appointments appeased both sides. Manuel was retained 
in a new portfolio within the Presidency and Pravin Gordhan, who had just 
completed a sterling performance as Commissioner in the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS), was brought in to appease the markets. But they were coupled 
with Rob Davies in Trade and Industry, Ebrahim Patel in Economic Development 
and Barbara Hogan in Public Enterprises. The net effect was to prompt debate 
in the corridors of economic power. Furthermore, it gave multiple stakeholders 
the prospect of influencing policy. More importantly, it demonstrated a cogent 
attempt at an inclusive style of governing - rather than an exclusive and centrist 
one, as was the case under Mbeki. 
A similar logic was applied in other appointments, which appealed to 
multiple stakeholders. Gill Marcus in the Reserve Bank is a case in point. A 
longtime stalwart of the ANC, she had served in previous stints in Treasury 
and the Reserve Bank. Her stopover in the private sector involved not only 
chairing a board of a mining company, but also the largest bank in South Africa 
- Absa.5 Her appeal transcended business boundaries, which was evident 
when both Cosatu and the Communist Party welcomed her appointment. Her 
strength lay simply in that she had not become a fundamentalist in economic 
ideology. She was pragmatic and as a result appealed to multiple stakeholders. 
A similar desire to appeal to multiple stakeholders informed Zuma's decision 
to nominate Sandile Ngcobo as Chief Justice. With extensive experience on 
the bench, Ngcobo had all the necessary qualifications. Yet he was considered 
an outsider. But his reserved demeanour and dignity in office triumphed over 
the colourful and controversial characteristics of other candidates - particularly 
Judge Hlophe6. Again a candidate that appealed to multiple audiences won over 
those with narrower appeals. 
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Off course, there were some exceptions to this. Two of the most controversial 
included Mo Shaik's appointment as Director General of the South African 
Secret Service and Menzi Simelane's appointment as Director of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA). While Shaik was perceived as technically 
efficient, his appointment was nevertheless seen as a way fore Zuma to reassert 
control over the intelligence and security services. Many perceived Simelane's 
appointment as the deployment of an unethical apparatchik, which served 
as a reward for past services rendered. Indeed this is the very way that the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) has portrayed his appointment in its court challenge 
(DA nd). These appointments, together with replacing the Scorpions with the 
Hawks and ministerial interventions through the Judicial Services Council (JSC) 
to change the demography of the bench, suggests that, in the security and justice 
sectors, the Zuma administration has been less concerned with appealing to 
multiple stakeholders, and far more with satisfying internal opinion within the 
Zuma camp. 
Nevertheless, outside this arena, Zuma has been keen to win popular support 
for his appointments. But responsiveness to citizens and stakeholders concerns 
was reflected in other ways as well. It was reflected in the Minister of Higher 
Education and Training Blade Nzimande's concerns about affordable tertiary 
education and his interest in rebuilding the post-secondary training and college 
sector to absorb the three million unemployed youth who are not at university 
(Nzimande 2009). Furthermore, it was reflected in Deputy Minister Ebrahim's 
overtures to the human rights community after condemning the Myanmar 
military for the continued incarceration of Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation's confirmation that the 
Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, would be arrested if he were to visit South 
Africa (Hartley 2009). And finally, it was demonstrated in the ANC's annual 
address Jacob Zuma delivered in January 2010. In his speech, Zuma indicated 
that civil servants at municipal government level should not hold leadership 
positions in political parties. Furthermore, he pointed out that severe action 
should be taken against errant employees - even if they are senior members of 
the ruling party (Zuma 2010). 
But perhaps the strongest indication of responsiveness to, and a respect for, 
multiple, stakeholders is the Zuma administration's incipient economic policy. 
On the one hand there is a strong continuity with the Mbeki government's policy 
agenda, which had shifted to the left in its last few years of power. Privitisation 
was no longer a national priority, as it was in the late 1990s. Since 2001, there 
had been a significant increase in social support grants. This had insured that 12 
million people - a quarter of the population - received such aid towards the end 
of Mbeki's presidential tenure. In addition, the Health and Education budgets 
had been on a steep rise for a number of years. Moreover, since 2004, South 
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Africa had a major state-led R780 billion investment programme that focused 
on infrastructure (Habib 2004). The official rhetoric - both under Mbeki and 
now under Zuma - speaks of the developmental state. However, as is indicated 
later, different stakeholders imply very different things by the term. 
Economic policy under Zuma is likely to maintain this gradual shift to the 
left. It is unlikely to constitute a radical departure from Mbeki's agenda. Notably, 
South Africa is unlikely to see the nationalisation of Sasol or Mittal, as the SACP 
had called for (Cronin 2009). The shifts that do occur are likely to be subtle and 
in line with existing structures. Furthermore, economic policy will be directed 
at both protecting and spreading the benefits of democratic transition. This is 
reflected in a number of recent developments, such as the State's drive to fix 
service delivery (South Africa Info 26 April 2010). It is also reflected in the R2.5 
billion the State set aside in 2009 to help retrain workers who were retrenched as 
a result of the economic recession (Senia 2009). Similarly, this economic policy 
was highlighted when Ebrahim Patel announced a rescue attempt for the Frame 
Group in order to help protect jobs (Donnelly 2009). The proposed National 
Health Insurance (NHI), which is likely to come into effect within the next year 
or two, (South Africa Info 12 February 2010) also reflects this. Moreover, it is 
evident in both fiscal and monetary policies. 
In the midst of the economic crisis, Pravin Gordhan projected in October 
2009 that the fiscal deficit would expand to 7.6 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP). This will enable spending on social and economic development 
initiatives, such as maintaining the infrastructural programme, and expanding 
social support grants for rural development, education and healthcare (Gordhan 
2009).7 Yet most commentators - including the ones representing business 
- acknowledged that this expansion of the fiscal deficit was necessary and 
manageable. And, in comparison it was much more conservative than those 
of South Africa's main trading partners (Isa 2009). Similarly, interest rates have 
maintained a downward trajectory, but are nowhere near Cosatu's demand 
of 3 percent8. A debate has started on the Reserve Bank's mandate. Although 
still cautious, bank officials are becoming as responsive to employment issues 
as they are to concerns of inflation. Essentially, South Africa's economic 
environment had begun to move in a Keynesian direction in the last years 
of the Mbeki presidency. This trend is likely to be consolidated under the 
Zuma administration. 
CRACKS BETWEEN COMRADES 
However, this responsiveness to multiple stakeholders has had consequences. 
Perhaps the most significant is that it has begun to create cracks in the ruling 
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party and Tripartite Alliance. The most public manifestation of this was at 
the 2009 SACP Congress. This event will be remembered for Julius Malema 
being booed by delegates, his argument with Gwede Mantashe for not being 
able to address the congress, his subsequent walk-out with Billy Masethla and 
Tony Yengeni, as well as the ensuing spat and public debate that surrounded 
it. But this is not the first spat. In the last few months of 2009, South Africa 
witnessed acrimonious public engagements between alliance partners over 
the National Planning Commission (NPC), leadership battles within parastatals 
(especially Eskom and Transnet), as well as the nationalisation of mines. The 
aforementioned culminated in the tensions at the SACP Congress. The question 
on everyone's lips was, "What is going on?" 
At the outset, it must be said that many commentators observed that the 
Zuma camp represented an assortment of individuals - nationalists, socialists, 
even conservatives and established or aspirant business people looking for 
the next quick deal. This disparate group formed a united front in the buildup 
to Polokwane and had a collective desire to get rid of Mbeki. Most observers 
recognised that this camp would begin to bicker and fracture once their 
collective objective had been achieved. And this is exactly what we have 
witnessed. At the heart of the conflicts are serious differences about the goals 
South Africa should pursue, where it is in this regard, as well as what policies it 
should advance9. However, the ANC leadership should be concerned that these 
differences are not being engaged in a robust but comradely fashion. Rather, 
it looks more like a debate between enemies, as it is characterised by name-
calling, racial labeling and the fact that issues are personalised. In many ways, 
it has a similar flavour to the pre-Polokwane debate. This should be of concern 
to the leadership, since the ruling party cannot afford another round of divisions 
after the bruising duel between Zuma and Mbeki. 
The conflict between the nationalists and socialists, which does not coincide 
with the organisational boundaries of the Tripartite Alliance, exploded into the 
public domain in the debate surrounding the National Planning Commission 
(NPC). When Manuel moved to consolidate his position through the Green 
Paper: National Strategic Planning (The Presidency 2009), Cosatu interpreted 
this as a power grab and an attempt by the Mbeki camp to return and dominate 
Government thinking through Manuel and the NPC. Zwelinzima Vavi responded, 
essentially launching a pre-emptive critique from the podium of the COSATU 
Congress (Marrian and Serino. 2009). Notably, this response signaled that the 
'left' was on guard to ensure that their policy victories in Polokwane would 
not be thwarted. The attack itself was highly personalised and unfair towards 
Manuel.10 But it also served to galvanise the mumbling voices that had been 
bubbling at the organisational surface with regard to communists' influence. 
Furthermore, it reinvigorated the "nationalist" wing into action. Billy Masethla 
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was the first to go public with regard to his concerns about communist influence 
in the ANC (Letsoalo and Tabane 2009). Notably, other members of the ANC 
national executive council (NEC), including Tony Yengeni and subsequently 
Julius Malema", supported Masethla's concerns. This explains delegates' hostility 
towards them at the SACP Congress. 
As this debate subsided, others bubbled to the surface. The next round of 
tension emerged around the leadership battles within the parastatals - first 
at Transnet and then at Eskom. In both the nationalists seemed to support 
Siyabonga Gama and Jacob Maroga against their respective boards in the 
battle for control over Transnet and Eskom respectively. The unions and the 
SACP, in contrast, took a broader view. They interpreted these conflicts as 
involving issues of competence, delivery and the development mandate. This 
was most dramatically demonstrated in the Eskom debacle. Whereas the Black 
Management Forum (BMF) and the ANC Youth League, through Julius Malema, 
defended Maroga against the chair of the board and accused Bobby Goclsell of 
being racist (Bell 2009), the unions' responses were far more politically mature 
and compliant with corporate governance principles (Habib 2009). Their stance 
suggested a perspective that the development mandate takes priority if there is 
a tension between it and the goal of representivity. This is not to suggest that 
the unions do not support demographic representivity. Of course they do. But, 
through this stance, they signaled that representivity should not come at the cost 
of delivery and the development mandate. 
The most recent conflict revolved around the nationalisation of mines. It was 
occasioned by recent calls by the likes of Malema to consider the ostensibly 
radical recommendation of nationalising South Africa's mines (Govender 
2010). Jeremy Cronin, Deputy General Secretary of the SACP and Deputy 
Minister of Transport, critically analysed the proposal and suggested that it was 
inappropriate, since these marginal assets would saddle the state with high 
levels of debt (Cronin 2009). Malema responded harshly and accused Cronin 
of acting as a "white messiah". This racialised and chauvinistic response was 
similar to one Dumisani Makhaye launched against Cronin during the Mbeki 
era12. This time, however, Cronin's comrades rallied to his defense, provoking 
the serious public spat between the SACP and the ANC Youth League. Cosatu 
and the SACP's response to both the leadership battles within the parastatals 
and the nationalisation debate highlights their concern that the nationalist wing 
is increasingly motivated by the narrow aspirations of BEE entrepreneurs (Baleni 
2009; Vavi 2009). Their opposition to the nationalists indicates that, where this 
is in conflict with the broader development mandate, Cosatu and the SACP will 
increasingly favour broad-based inclusive development. 
Tokyo Sexwale is said to have made the point at the SACP Congress that 
communists must respect the boundaries between the national democratic 
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and socialist phases of South Africa's transition. Notably, the ANC's nationalist 
wing maintain that the SACP and Cosatu ignore the fact that this is the national-
democratic and not the socialist phase of the country's transition. But is this 
actually true? Even in ANC lexicon the national democratic phase is not meant 
to focus on a conservative black capitalism. Rather, it is envisaged as a social 
democratic society; a mixed economy in which an inclusive development is 
at the core of the state's agenda (ANC 2007). The narrow interests of black 
capitalists are not meant to predominate. Instead, their interests, along with 
those of the broader capitalist class, are meant to be harmonised with broader 
citizenry's interests, as has happened in social democratic societies around the 
world. Inclusive development - rather than narrow enrichment - is meant to be 
the central motif of the national democratic phase of the transition. 
In this sense, Cosatu and the SACP are more consistent to the ANC's 
vision. They are not advancing socialist goals. If they had been, they would 
be opposed to BEE, since it involves private ownership. Instead, they support 
BEE, but demand that it be broadened to incorporate new small entrepreneurs 
and community groups. The central message from Zwelinzima Vavi, Blade 
Nzimande, Jeremy Cronin and others is inclusive development: a market 
economy that serves a broader range of stakeholders". They have come out 
heavily against corruption - particular around the tendering processes at local 
government level. Furthermore, they have insisted that BEE be broad-based and 
supportive of broader developmental goals. And, they have insisted that the 
interests of business must be harmonized with those of inclusive development. 
Where the two are in conflict, they have insisted that inclusive development 
be prioritised. 
Although Cosatu and the SACP have been on the right policy track when 
it comes to democracy and inclusive development, their behavior has not 
always fostered these goals. As indicated earlier, the debate around the NPC 
was unnecessarily personalised. Similarly, the booing of invited guests from 
the ANC NEC including Billy Masethla, Tony Yengeni and Julius Malema is 
not acceptable. Even if the Malema engages in such conduct, Cosatu and the 
SACP need to transcend this type of behaviour- if only because it hinders open, 
robust and respectful debate. Frankly, the debate between the nationalists and 
socialists within the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance resembles that of enemies 
rather than comrades who support a common struggle. 
The essential challenge confronting Zuma is how to maintain this new era 
of openness and responsiveness by enabling debate between ideologically 
contending partners without allowing it to become so acrimonious that it 
fractures his support base. This is what he has attempted to do on a number of 
occasions over the last few months with public pleas for comradely behavior 
and discourse. But these pleas seem to have fallen on deaf ears. Some of his 
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supporters, such as Julius Malema, have chosen to ignore these pleas altogether. 
Unless Zuma is able to curtail this kind of behaviour, fractures in the ruling 
party, as well as the Zuma Tripartite Alliance are likely to grow. 
SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS AND THE 
SEARCH FOR A SOCIAL PACT 
Another consequence of both this responsiveness to multiple stakeholders and 
the economic crisis was the upsurge of labour and service delivery activism 
following the ANC's victory in the April 2009 general elections. Unions became 
more active and robust in their wage negotiations that led to a rolling set of 
public and private sector strikes. The biting effects of the economic recession 
and a global backlash against corporate executive remuneration packages 
served as catalysts for these actions. Furthermore, the unions feared that history 
might repeat itself and that the ANC, including those Cosatu officials deployed 
to Cabinet and Government, may abandon their roots and promises and be 
seduced by the trappings of office14. This was followed by a series of community 
protests around the failures of service delivery, which were mainly directed at 
errant municipal leaders and officials. 
Two distinct responses emerged to this labour and service delivery activism. 
Firstly, as they were caught off guard, both business and political leaders initially 
reacted immaturely. ANC leaders, most notably its General Secretary, Gwede 
Mantashe, berated workers for compromising the Zuma administration's image 
(Du Plessis 2009). Business leaders characteristically resorted to threats that 
were mainly published in business newspapers and magazines, which warned 
that this type of labour activism would lead to investment fleeing South Africa's 
shores (Monteiro 2008). 
But there was also a more positive response from Zuma. Soon after the 
aforementioned responses Zuma noted that he understood the people's pain, 
but urged them not to resort to violence. His Minister and Deputy Minister of 
Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, Sicelo Shiceka and Yunus 
Carrim respectively, criss-crossed the country to visit the service delivery 
hotspots. Zuma himself went to Balfour, where service delivery protests had 
tempers flaring in the community. There were even cases like Standerton where 
non-responsive local ANC leaders were either dismissed or replaced in office. 
All of this was in marked contrast to Mbeki and his ministers' conduct a year 
earlier during the xenophobia attacks. In the midst of these strikes and service 
delivery protests - and business and state reactions to them - the idea of social 
pacts re-emerged. These social pacts were advocated by a number of leaders 
from the contesting stakeholders, as well as by academics and commentators. 
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The social pact attempted in the 1990s - remnants of which still exist today 
- failed because structural conditions were not conducive to ensuring equitable 
outcomes for all social partners (Habib 2010). In essence, it became a co-optive 
mechanism to emasculate labour's demands. Is a social pact then, more feasible 
within the current context? Has the structural context changed that much? Three 
developments suggest that this may indeed be the case. Firstly, Cosatu and the 
SACP are in a more empowered position in the post-Polokwane era. Notably, 
there are a number of Cabinet ministers in the post-April 2009 Cabinet who 
were either deployed by Cosatu and the SACP or are partial to their interests, 
policy proposals and ideological leanings. As was indicated earlier, this must 
not be interpreted to suggest that Cosatu and the SACP control the ANC and 
the State. Indeed, this is far from the case. Business has significant leverage, as 
is reflected both in the appointments of Trevor Manuel and Pravin Gordan, as 
well as the 2010 annual budget (National Treasury 2010 & Isa and Ensor 2010). 
But there are also other ministers appointed in the economic corridors of power, 
such as Rob Davies in Trade and Industry and Ebrahim Patel in Economic 
Planning. When compared to the Mbeki era, these appointments suggest a 
more profound plurality of ideological thought within economic portfolios. This 
equalisation of economic voice between labour and business shows that labour 
now enjoys more power. Furthermore, this implies that political and economic 
elites are uncertain of their future and may be more inclined to form viable, 
equitable social pacts. 
Secondly, as a result of the above, the developmental state is firmly on South 
Africa's policy makers' agenda. To be fair, the concept originally emerged in 
post-Apartheid South Africa's political lexicon at the dawn of the democratic 
transition. Hereafter, it disappeared for about a decade and re-appeared in 
the Mbeki administration's policy documents in the post-2004 era. Since then, 
all ANC factions ostensibly support the establishment of a development state. 
Hence, it has become one of the Zuma administration's official goals. But the 
apparent consensus is facile when one considers that the various factions tend 
to imply very different things when referring to the concept. 
This was clearly evident in the debate that surrounded the NPC, which emerged 
when Trevor Manuel issued his Green Paper discussing its establishment and 
mandate (The Presidency 2009). Given that planning forms an integral part of 
any developmental state, one would have expected broad support for the NPC. 
Yet, as was indicated earlier, Cosatu and the SACP criticised Manuel's proposals 
in this regard (Marrian and Serino 2009). The unions feared that Manuel was 
setting himself up as the de facto prime minister and would introduce what 
they term the 1996 class project - a euphemism for the Mbeki policy agenda. 
One can only make sense of this opposition when one understands that Cosatu 
and the SACP feared that under Manuel, development would be reduced to 
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simple technicist planning. In essence, they feared that the developmental state 
would be shorn of its substantive meaning and ideological rationale; namely, 
that of conditioning market behaviour to promote inclusive development and a 
form of social democracy. Despite these differing interpretations of the concept, 
even the thin consensus on the goal of the developmental state suggests that the 
post-2009 policy environment differs significantly from its 1990s predecessor. 
Subsequently, it is much more conducive to establishing of a viable social pact. 
Thirdly, the international environment also seems to be more conducive to 
equitable social pacts. The global economic crisis - probably the second most 
serious in a century - has weakened the power of multinational corporations and 
has as a result implicitly enhanced the leverage of states and national political 
elites. This has enabled a substantial change in the global macro-economic 
policy environment. Starting under the Bush administration and continuing 
especially under the Obama administration, the American establishment threw 
out the precepts of the Washington Consensus and intervened significantly in 
the markets. As a result United States banks were virtually nationalised through 
the largest bailout in history. Similar bailouts were facilitated for the motor 
vehicle industry and other conglomerates. Effectively, the American State, along 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), addressed this crisis in exactly the 
same way it had prevented developing nations from managing theirs. And the 
Americans were not alone. Similar market-related interventions were undertaken 
by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Japan and almost every 
other major economy in the world. The net effect was that the global macro-
economic environment shifted in a quasi-Keynesian direction (Blankenburg and 
Gabriel Palma 2009). 
South Africa had already begun to move down this path even before the 
crisis. Moreover, as was indicated earlier, it is unlikely that there will be a radical 
departure in economic policy between the Mbeki and Zuma administrations. 
Rather, one can expect continuity in economic policy, with a slow drift in a 
Keynesian direction. The balance of power and broader structural dynamics, 
including economic developments in both the global and national setting, are 
therefore much more facilitative of equitable social pacts than they were in the 
1990s. But structural conditions alone do not foster social pacts. Such pacts also 
require political will and leadership. Notably, South Africa's current political 
leadership has been lacking in this regard. This was most clearly evident in 
President Zuma's first State of the Nation address in June 2009 (Zuma 2009). 
Confronted by a set of rolling labour strikes and service delivery protests, Zuma 
responded by promising everything to everyone. There is not much that one 
could disagree with in his speech. He gave business what it wanted. He gave 
labour what they wanted. Students got what they wanted. Middle and upper 
middle class citizens got what they wanted. But, by saying everything, he in 
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effect said nothing. No choices were made. No trade-offs were undertaken. 
In the process, he missed an important opportunity to define his political 
administration and establish the essential precondition for a social pact. 
It must be understood that social pacts are established by state elites, with 
the willing participation and organised expressions of relevant social actors 
(Stepan 1978). They are essentially about managing the expectations of citizens, 
workers, and even the business community. In this Zuma, his ministers, and 
the ANC leadership have essentially failed. This is because both the ANC 
and Government's responses have not been all that imaginative. Gwede 
Mantashe responded by chastising Cosatu workers for compromising the Zuma 
administration's image. Trevor Manuel accused business of cowardice and 
asked it to stand up to the might of the unions (Mathe 2009). President Zuma 
has remained silent on the issue, characteristically promising everything to 
everyone in his State of the Nation address. None of this has or will enable the 
management of popular expectations. 
However, only astute political management can address the aforementioned 
ambiguities. This does not mean berating workers for populism or compromising 
Zuma's image. Rather, it would have required the president to use his State of 
the Nation address to inspire a nation. President Zuma could have begun by 
identifying the dilemma he was confronted with and recording that he was 
not the architect of it. He should have also recognised the hypocrisy of the 
public debate, where workers were berated for asking for small increases in real 
terms, while CEOs and company executives were not chastised for their overly-
extravagant remuneration packages. Furthermore, Zuma should have explained 
that, while he recognised the need for the increases and sympathised with the 
economic plight of the workers, he did not have the resources to address their 
salary demands immediately. Zuma could have then legitimately asked for time. 
Hereafter, he could have provided what was immediately possible, while he 
established a process with representatives from all sides. In essence, this would 
have activated a social pact to find a solution to the dilemma over the next three 
to five years. 
To legitimise his request, President Zuma should have also berated executives 
for their lavish packages. He should have asked them to forego their bonuses 
this year, and to take lower than inflationary increases in their packages. The 
President should have said that workers, the poor and marginalised should not 
be the only ones forced to make sacrifices, but that the rich and the upper 
middle classes should also forfeit certain things. After all, every stakeholder 
must be required to make sacrifices in the national interest in this recessionary 
environment. Naturally, industry economists and Minister Trevor Manuel would 
have warned us of disillusioning the business community and investment fleeing 
our shores. But is this really true, or is it scaremongering? As long as a climate 
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exists to make profit, the business community is mature enough to remain. 
Remember, President Obama has berated American business executives for their 
lavish million dollar bonuses, remuneration packages and expense accounts 
(Kopecki and Goldma, 2009). Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have 
done the same. Yet none of them have a single communist in their ranks. How 
is it possible that this Government, which has at least half a dozen openly-
committed communists and socialists in the Cabinet, cannot do the same? 
The irony is that, whereas the social pact of the 1990s failed because of 
structural conditions, the one of the post-April 2009 era may be stillborn 
due to a lack of bold political leadership. Such leadership needs to manage 
the expectations of citizens, workers and the business community. ANC and 
government leaders have tried the former, but not the latter. Paralysed by a 
fear of how markets would react, political elites are reluctant to reign in the 
expectations of business executives and the upper middle class.15 But, as long 
as they fail to do so (or are perceived to be doing so), they will fail to curtail 
popular expectations. Popular and privileged expectations are tied by an 
umbilical cord, and neither can be reigned in without the other. And, as long as 
this is not done, a social pact cannot be realised. 
THE STATE OF PUBLIC SERVICE 
But, even if popular expectations were reigned in, the problem would not have 
been sustainably addressed without significantly improving service delivery. 
This, of course, depends on the state of the public service. So, what is the 
state of affairs in this regard? Is the public service in any position to deliver on 
the mandate for service delivery? The commonly-held view among both the 
citizenry and significant stakeholders, such as business is that the public service 
is incapable of fulfilling its obligations in this regard. This is seen as a result of a 
lack of capacity among civil servants that, in turn, is ascribed to an Affirmative 
Action policy or a misguided party deployment policy (CDE 2010). In such 
circumstances corruption runs rampant and is not dealt with firmly. This is either 
because of party loyalty or an inefficient justice system. The net effect of this 
is that citizens are denied basic services and become demoralised, while the 
country's post-Apartheid democracy runs the risk of becoming delegitimised. 
But does this diagnosis and prognosis not provide an over-simplified 
explanation? After all, it assumes that the Apartheid civil service has the 
necessary capacity and was capable of servicing the citizenry. However, a fair 
body of evidence suggests that this was not the case. One needs to note the 
fact that the Apartheid civil service was organised to service a minority and 
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suppress a majority. In these circumstances, it was in no position to deliver 
on the aspirations of the post-Apartheid regime's aspirations. Moreover, it is 
worth bearing in mind that transforming the civil service into a demographically 
representative entity is necessary to generate a legitimate system. Given this, it 
is hard to sustain the argument suggesting that South Africa would have been 
better off if the Apartheid civil service had been left intact. 
Nevertheless, this should not dissuade us from recognising that there are 
serious deficiencies in the current public service. Notably, post-Apartheid 
Government's policies and choices played a role in this situation. However, 
affirmative action cannot simply be blamed for the state of the post-Apartheid 
public service. Rather, it is coupling affirmative action with conservative macro-
economic policies, as well instilling a corporate ethic in the public service that 
collectively generated this state of affairs (Habib 2004 & Chipkin 2008). One 
should bear in mind that any transfer of skills and capacity involves two distinct 
processes: training and mentorship. The adoption of the Growth, Employment, 
and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) circumvented this process (Streak, 2004). 
GEAR required cuts in State expenditure, which meant fewer state employees 
at the very point when the State had to be demographically transformed. As 
blacks were being recruited to the civil service, white incumbents were allowed 
- and even encouraged - to exit the system. Not only did this cause a loss of 
institutional memory, but it also sabotaged the skills transfer process. The very 
people who could have played the role of mentors were no longer in the public 
service. Black recruits - particularly newly-qualified young university graduates 
- were set up for failure as they entered the public service. 
This process played itself out most tragically in the Department of Education. 
Driven by a desire to cut costs, as required by Gear, the department began 
to retrench teachers during the second half of the 1990s. Trying to avoid an 
adversarial process, it offered teachers a voluntary severance package. Not 
surprisingly, the best teachers in the system took up the offer.16 The least 
qualified teachers remained in the system. As a result, the public education 
system's capacity declined significantly. Undisputedly, we are still living with 
the consequences today. This process played itself out in department-after-
department in the post-Apartheid State. The only departments that seem to 
have avoided this fate are the National Treasury and the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS), both of which played a crucial role in the economic ambitions 
of the post-Apartheid State. 
Party deployment aggravated the problem. Ironically, in this case the ANC 
followed the conventional Marxist revolutionary tradition that sees the State as 
merely an agency to be captured by the party. Hence, it established a committee 
to manage the deployment of cadres to the public service (Mbeki 2006). 
Deployment, of course, takes place in all countries and need not be antithetical 
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to democracy. But, if it is to be consistent with democracy, deployment 
boundaries need be established and respected. Simply put, deployment is 
permissible if it were contained to political appointments (ministers, deputy 
ministers) and the most senior levels of the public service (perhaps director 
generals). However, the ANC deployed cadres across the State's institutional 
system. This was sometimes done with the party leadership's consent, and other 
times without. In these cases party loyalty - rather than skills - became the 
defining criteria for employment. 
Add to this mix the infusion of a corporate ethic into public institutions. 
To be fair, the principles of new public administration predated the ANC's 
ascent to power. It formed part of a worldwide phenomenon that arose from 
public administration schools within the US and Britain, which infected most 
parts of the public service across the globe. Within a South African context, 
it included expanding the State's managerial players, a growing inequality 
between the remuneration of public sector managers and employees, as well 
as the widespread use of quantitative performance management systems that 
were adopted from the private sector and not critically reflected upon (Naidoo 
2008 & Chipkin 2008). With regard to the latter, quantitative benchmarks were 
established for transformation targets to which annual bonuses were tied. One 
of the perverse consequences was that it benefited a public service manager not 
to employ a white candidate in a vacancy, even if there was no black candidate 
available, since it would compromise both her/his transformation targets and 
annual bonus. It did not matter that such behavior violated the very spirit of the 
South African Constitution. In accordance with the quantitative character of the 
performance management system, public sector managers rationally believed 
that it was more beneficial to leave vacancies unfilled - rather than to appoint 
white candidates (Bentley and Habib 2008). 
The net effect of coupling affirmative action with conservative economics, 
as well as infusing corporate ethics into the public service system severely 
compromised the capacity of the civil servants and hobbled their ability to 
deliver services to the citizenry. Subsequently, the public service was saddled 
with employees who had severe skill-related deficiencies. Moreover, there 
were too many individuals who were deployed for the wrong reasons, such as 
procuring state tenders As a result, corruption spread through the entire state 
system. This further compromised the State's capacity and delegitimised it -
particularly at the local government level. 
But one must guard against implying that the service delivery problems 
are simply due to skills deficits of state employees and corruption. Inadequate 
resources also contribute to the crisis. This might seem surprising given 
the conventional wisdom that has developed in state, business and public 
administration circles suggesting resources are not a problem. After all, 
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many departments have failed to spend their allocated resources. Moreover, 
the State has also run a surplus for a number of years. Yet, failure to spend 
cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that there is adequate resourcing 
- especially where public institutions suffer from a capacity deficit. The surplus 
may actually be the result of incapacity. In the cases where state-related 
incapacity is adequately addressed, resources are likely to become a serious 
obstacle to effective service delivery. 
How do we address this crisis in state-related capacity? Firstly, it is 
imperative that we re-establish the mentorship dimension of the skills transfer 
process. This requires the implementation of a more nuanced affirmative action 
policy, as well as a more expansive fiscal agenda that is directed at expanding 
the public service and building a developmental state. Secondly, the public 
mandate of public institutions needs to be re-established and reinvigorated. 
Senior civil servants need to be measured in substantive terms. They should 
not be measured against achieving fiscal surpluses, but rather on delivering 
the services they are responsible for. These assessments must also be more 
qualitatively grounded than is presently the case. Thirdly, service delivery 
programmes must be more adequately resourced. It is important to recognise 
that South Africa cannot have first world ambitions and third world investments. 
Programmes require a much higher level of resources if we are to sensibly 
address the Apartheid legacy. 
Finally, corruption in the public service has to be firmly dealt with and 
rooted out. Too often are political and economic elites allowed to get away with 
blatant corruption and unethical practices. Party leaders tend to hide behind the 
principal "presumed innocent until proven guilty". But it needs to be recognised 
that a democratic state's legitimacy is driven by perceptions. And, as long as a 
different law is seen to apply to elites, corruption will endure and continue to 
plague us. Corruption can only truly be dealt with if there is serious political 
will and leadership. And as long as this is not forthcoming, we will continue to 
grapple with the problem of state capacity and thereby service delivery. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion: the Zuma administration is much more responsive to citizens and 
interest group stakeholders' interests. Economic policy has been - and is likely 
to - continue to shift marginally to the left, as was the case during Mbeki's final 
years in power. But the cost of this responsiveness to citizen and stakeholder 
interests has been a robust ideological contestation within the ANC. Similarly, 
the desire to appease corporate and economic elite interests has meant that 
elite expectations are not being moderated. This, in turn, does not help contain 
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popular expectations. In this case, the net result will be a failure to realise a 
social pact between business, labour, and the State. 
Notably, State capacity has been compromised as a result of the coupling 
of affirmative action with conservative macro-economic policies, as well as 
the infusion of a corporate ethic into the public service. The situation is never 
going to be addressed adequately without a nuanced affirmative action policy, a 
reinvigorated public mandate for the civil service, a more expansive fiscal agenda 
centered on the citizenry, as well as firm action against corruption. The Zuma 
administration recognises many of these factors and has begun to implement 
them. But, in this regard, its programme has been debilitated by shoddy business 
dealings of economic elites close to the Zuma camp. This includes members of 
its own Cabinet, whom it has been reluctant to act against. This has created the 
perception that an uneven legal and public hand is being applied in the country. 
One set of rules apply to citizens, while another seems to be reserved for the 
political figures of, and business interests aligned to, the Zuma administration. 
And, as long as such a perception prevails, South Africa's democratic future and 
its developmental aspirations will remain compromised. 
NOTES 
1 This article is an edited version of a paper commissioned by the Public Administration, Leadership 
and Management Academy of the Republic of South Africa (Palama), which is to be published in 
a forthcoming edited book by Juta Press. 
2 Adam Habib is Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Research, Innovation and Advancement at the 
University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
3 The Mbeki camp registered at least 40 percent of the votes of delegates at the Polokwane 
Conference, while Zuma and his candidates received almost 60 percent of support. See 
Wikepedia, nd. 
4 Mbeki's administration is perceived as not having been sensitive to public opinion, particularly 
on issues of HIV/Aids and crime. See Habib 2007. 
5 Gill Marcus also served as a professor at the Gordon Institute of Business (GIBS), the University 
of Pretoria's Business School. 
6 Hlophe had become a serious headache for the Zuma administration, as he has managed to 
racially polarise the bench and the legal fraternity. See Davis 2010. 
7 Latest projections suggest that as a result of better than expected tax revenue, this deficit is likely 
to come in at 6.7 percent. See Gordhan 2010. 
8 Interest rates have been reduced five times in the last year and now stands at 10.5 percent. 
9 Other analysts like Steven Friedman, hold the view that these divisions are inspired by a careerist 
struggle for positions in the ruling party and the State. See Friedman 2010. 
2 0 Administrate Publico | Vol 18 No 3 September 2010 
10 Vavi essentially accused Manuel of usurping power by stealth and setting himself up as the de 
facto prime minister. See Karima Brown and Amy Musgrave 2009. 
11 Malema suggested at the Pretoria Press Club that the ANC Youth League would fight "greedy, 
yellow communists" and prevent them form controlling the ANC. See Roussouw 2009. 
12 Makhaye accused Cronin of being a Trotskyist and a "white messiah" for having acknowledged 
in an interview with Helena Sheehan that," . . . there are tendencies now of what some of us refer 
to as the Zanufication of the ANC" (Cronin 2002) For Makhaye's attack, see Sowetan 29 July 
2002. Outrageously enough, the ANC's NEC censured Cronin and forced him to apologise. 
13 Obviously the language they use is replete with references to the 'working class' and 'poor.' But 
the substantive meaning of their immediate policies is an inclusive development. 
14 One has to only look at the examples of Cyril Ramaphosa, Johnny Copelyn, Marcel Golding and 
Sam Shilowa. The former three went on to become business moguls, whereas Shilowa became 
Premier of Gauteng, as well as one of Mbeki's most ardent supporters. 
15 This was again demonstrated in Pravin Gordhan's pro-business maiden budget speech delivered 
in February 2010. While the budget was necessarily expansionary, it was accompanied by a 
conservative political rhetoric. The Reserve Bank's original mandate, which focuses solely on 
inflation and ignored unemployment, was retained even though most Reserve Banks around 
the world focus on both goals. The inflation band of 3-6 percent was also retained even though 
there would not have been any market collapse had the band been adjusted slightly. The speech 
forced Zwelinzima Vavi to critique Gordhan harshly and to threaten a general strike later in 
2010. 
16 See Afrimap and Open Society Foundation for SA 2007: pp. ix. 
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